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Abbreviations 
Art.   Article  
DD  Discussion draft  
e.g    exempli gratia  
IBFD   International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation  
MNE   Multinational Enterprise  
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OECD MTC  OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital  
para.   paragraph  
pg.   page  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") has produced 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines ("TPG") to help both business and tax administrations apply the 
arm’s length principle, introducing the separate entity approach for pricing the internal 
transactions. The individual members of the group should be taxed as though they have taken 
place between unrelated parties, on the basis that they act on the arm’s length in their intra-
group transactions. However, the relationship between the group members of a Multi 
National Entity ("MNE") group differs from the one that unrelated parties would have while 
operating on the open market. The usage of special conditions in the intra-group relations 
may affect the correct application of the arm's length principle, which the OECD member 
countries have adopted in order to eliminate the differences in the levels of profit within 
members of the MNE group while applying this special conditions to the intra-group 
transactions.
1
 
 
On the other hand, OECD had adopted the Model Tax Convention on income and on capital 
(“MTC”), having the Article 9 as being a guiding principle determining the arms length 
principle for transfer pricing purposes. As per Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, 
where the conditions made or imposed between two associated enterprises differ from those 
that would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits that would, but by 
reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that 
enterprise and taxed accordingly.
2
 The latter is applicable to profits attributable to the group 
entities with regard to development and use or transfer of intangibles. However, Article 9 of 
the OECD Model Tax Convention is concerned with the conditions of transactions between 
associated enterprises, but any further details with regard to transfer pricing issues are not 
being discussed within the OECD Model Tax Convention, but by the OECD TPG.
3
The 
OECD member states have chosen these international taxation principles to serve the purpose 
of both securing the appropriate tax base in each jurisdiction and avoiding double taxation, 
aiming to solve or at least minimize any conflict between the MNE's and the tax authorities, 
supporting the international trade. 
 
In applying the foregoing principles to the taxation of MNEs, the establishment of the 
appropriate transfer prices within the intra-group transactions is considered to be the most 
difficult issue.
4
 The increase of the global economy has affected the importance of MNE 
groups by uprising significant issues related to transfer pricing that the MNE’s and tax 
administrations around the globe have to manage. The resolution of the transfer pricing issues 
may be deemed dependent on a solid understanding of the facts and the specific context of 
each separate case, and it may be relevant for settling down the disputes between the MNE’s 
and the tax administrations frequently involving large amount of tax that may or may not be 
                                                 
1
 OECD (2010) Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations; July 2010 
2
 OECD (2010) Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital Full Vertsion 22 July 2010; Article 9 
3
 OECD (2010) Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital; Comments on 
Article 9 of the OECD MTC 
4
 OECD (2010) Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations; July 2010; 
para. 11 
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due to be paid.
5
 On one hand MNE groups fear double taxation with regard to transfer pricing 
adjustments and on the other hand, may choose the manner of allocation of global profits by 
organizing their internal functions which may result in minimizing the tax due.
6
 
 
Putting the issue in a broader perspective, the disputes between the tax authorities of different 
countries would potentially lead to possible double taxation of the corporate profits of the 
MNE groups, which may lead to decreased level of international trade and eventually 
decreased global tax base and tax revenues. In this view, it is of an importance that countries 
agree on increasing the harmonization of their legislation with the principles established by 
OECD, but also to achieve agreement with regard to dispute resolution.
7
 
 
The key concern area identified by OECD was the definition, identification and valuation of 
intangibles for transfer pricing purposes and insufficient international guidelines within the 
area has been detected.
8
 In this regard, the identification of the parties that would be entitled 
to the return derived from intangibles, respectively the intangible related returns, is deemed to 
be one of the crucial aspects in determining the arm's length conditions within a MNE group. 
Following a transaction within MNE group members, determining the legal owner of a 
legally protected asset is an issue that needs to be put light on, despite that in case of an MNE 
group is possibly the lease complicated. However, not only the legal owner of an intangible is 
entitled to intangible related returns, at arm's length, with regard to the development or 
exploitation of that intangible, especially because the other party might have incurred 
significant risk and expenses related to the development of an intangible or the enhancement 
of its value.
9
 As per Article 9 of the OECD MTC each associated enterprise should obtain an 
arm’s length share in the benefits derived from the intangible. In determining the arm's length 
share an agreement of independent parties in comparable situation should be considered.
10
 
Therefore not only the legal ownership of the intangible should be taken into a consideration, 
but also the "economic ownership" arising from the development or exploitation of an 
intangible should be considered for the appropriate attribution of the economic benefits.
11
 
 
The OECD performs periodical updates to the TPG and the major revision has been 
completed in 2010. Clearer guidelines on transfer pricing of intangibles could overcome the 
uncertainty for both MNE's and tax authorities.. In January 2011, the OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs approved a scoping document for a new project looking at the transfer pricing 
aspect of intangibles. Further, on 6 June 2012, the OECD published the Discussion Draft 
“Revision of the Special Considerations for Intangibles in Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines and Related Provisions”, containing amongst other a proposed revision of 
Chapter VI of the TPG
12
 The transfer pricing aspect of the transactions involving intangibles 
between associated enterprises are to be examined in the scope of the arm's length principle 
                                                 
5
OECD (2012),Dealing Effectively with the Challenges of Transfer Pricing, OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264169463-en 
6
 OECD (2012), Dealing Effectively with the Challenges of Transfer Pricing, OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264169463-en 
7
 Andrea Musselli and Donatella Marchetti Hunter; Glaxo Transfer Pricing Case: Economic Rationale, Legal 
Framework and International Issue; INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING JOURNAL MAY/JUNE 2007 
pg.165 
8
 OECD (2011), Transfer Pricing and Intangibles: Scope of the OECD Project 2011, Document approved by the 
Committee of Fiscal Affairs on 25 January 2011; point 1 
9
 Ibid. point 23 
10
 Ibid. point 24 
11
 Ibid. point 25 
12
 Ibid. point 4 
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set out by Article 9 of the OECD MTC.
13
 In order to determine arm’s length conditions for 
the use or transfer of intangibles it is important to consider as part of the comparability and 
functional analysis: "(i) the identification of specific intangibles; (ii) the identification of the 
party(ies) that should be entitled to retain the return derived from the use or transfer of the 
intangibles; (iii) the nature of the controlled transactions and whether they involve the use of 
intangibles and/or lead to the transfer of intangibles between the parties; and (iv) the 
remuneration that would be paid between independent parties for the use or transfer of such 
intangibles".
14
 In June 2012 OECD published a Discussion Draft “Revision of the Special 
Considerations for Intangibles in Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and 
Related Provisions” ("Discussion Draft"). The latter emphasis the issue of the parties entitled 
to retain the revenue deriving from intangibles provided through the concept of intangible 
related returns. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
Transactions concerning intangibles, respectively intellectual property are playing an 
increasingly significant role, and consequently require special attention regarding the 
identification, valuation and transfer of intangibles for its tax treatment within the transfer 
pricing context. When determining the arm's length conditions, the transfer pricing aspects of 
intangibles may be guided following four parts, respectively the identification of intangibles, 
the identification of parties entitled to the intangible related returns, the determination of 
whether the controlled transaction involves the use or transfer of intangibles, and the 
remuneration to the parties entitled to the intangible related returns.
15
 The purpose of this 
thesis is to identify and discuss the issues with regard to the entitlement of the income arising 
from the development and use or transfer of the intangible property within the MNE group 
members. The application of the arm’s length principle with regard to allocation of the 
benefits as provided within the Art. 9 of the OECD MTC will be considered. Following the 
importance of the future enhancement of the harmonization of the legislation of the countries 
with the OECD principles, the OECD documents will be considered, especially the Chapters 
I-III, VI, VIII and IX of the OECD TPG, as well as the Discussion Draft with regard to 
Chapter VI will be observed in order to determine whether they provide for provisions that 
may be deemed useful with regard to the entitlement to intangible related returns concept and 
for consistency with regard to it.  
 
1.3 Method and Materials  
1.3.1 Method 
The TPG in their current version do not provide for a specific guidance for determining 
which members of the MNE group are entitled to intangible related returns. Neither the 
special provisions of Chapter VI " Special Considerations for Intangible Property" of the 
TPG provide so. However, following the specific concepts introduced within the TPG, 
                                                 
13
 Ibid. point 9 
14
 OECD (2012), Discussion Draft Revision of the special considerations for intangibles in Chapter VI of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and related provisions 6 June to 14 September 2012; para. 4 
15
 Ibid. 
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certain guidance may be found in Chapters I-III of the TPG, Chapter VIII "Cost Contribution 
Arrangements" of the TPG and Chapter IX "Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business 
Restructurings" of the TPG.  
 
Within this thesis the Transfer Pricing Guidelines in the current version will be studied in 
relation to the entitlement to intangible related returns, having the Discussion Draft as a 
sideline guide introducing some possible issues that may be relevant to intangible related 
returns, following that it does not represent a complete draft nor constitutes a part of the 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. A significant issue of the entitlement to intangible related return 
of an enterprise over an intangible that does not own has been considered within the 
Discussion Draft, introducing the concept of economic ownership, in opposition to the legal 
ownership over the intangible.
16
 The legal ownership, including the registration and the 
contractual agreements are the starting point for determining of the members of the MNE 
group entitled to intangible related returns. Further, the actual conduct of the parties is to be 
considered, following the concept of economic ownership. The parties performing the 
functions and bearing the risks, as well as bearing the costs related to the development, 
enhancement, maintenance and protection of the intangibles are entitled to obtain profits 
attributable to intangibles. However, passive bearing of costs related to the development, 
enhancement, maintenance and protection of a party does not create entitlement to intangible 
related returns.
17
 References will be drawn to Chapters I-II, VI, VIII and IX of the TPG, as 
well as to Article 9 of the OECD MTC. Secondary sources such as articles and doctrine will 
be used in order to support the thesis.  
  
1.3.2 Legal value of the OECD documents 
The OECD Model Tax Convention
18
 as per its legal value is commonly referred to as "soft 
law" and is not a binding legal act. However, numerous of the OECD member countries 
following the intention of eliminating double taxation, when concluding the bilateral 
conventions, conform with the provision of the OECD MTC.
19
 Even more, such practice has 
been extended over the non- OECD member countries as well by using the OECD MTC as a 
basic document of reference.
20
 By conclusion of the bilateral treaty it becomes a legally 
binding document for both of the contractual parties. Following the above, the Commentaries 
on the provisions of the MTC has facilitated the enforcement and the interpretation of the 
OECD MTC provision themselves, between the bilateral tax treaty parties.
21
 Departing from 
the OECD MTC is not excluded by any meanings, however should the parties decide to 
follow the provisions of the MTC it might be useful for both parties to follow the 
interpretation as given by the Commentaries. The enforcement and the interpretation is 
considered to be important part towards the harmonization of the bilateral conventions, and 
therefore the "naked" application of the MTC provision would be incomplete if the 
                                                 
16
 OECD (2011), Transfer Pricing and Intangibles: Scope of the OECD Project 2011, Document approved by 
the Committee of Fiscal Affairs on 25 January 2011; para. 23 
17
 OECD (2012), Discussion Draft Revision of the special considerations for intangibles in Chapter VI of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and related provisions 6 June to 14 September 2012; preface to Chapter B 
18
 OECD (2010) Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital Full Vertsion 22 July 2010 
19
 OECD (2010) Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital; Introduction 
para.13 
20
 OECD (2010) Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital; Introduction 
para.14 
21
 OECD (2010) Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital; Introduction 
para.15 
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Commentaries, putting a light on the provisions, are not been followed. Therefore, the MTC 
and the Commentaries may be deemed as being "one package".
22
  
 
Further to the Legal value of the OECD documents, the Transfer Pricing Guidelines have 
significant influence both on taxpayer and tax authorities, their application is not obligatory 
for the OECD member states and they do not have the status of a law. The aim of the OECD 
TPG is to support both taxpayers and tax administration by offering mutually acceptable 
solutions to transfer pricing problems and to lead to a consensus of the interpretation of the 
arm's length principle as provided in Article 9 of the OECD MTC.
23
 The significance of the 
OECD TPG as a source of law is described in the Commentary on Article 9 of the OECD 
MTC: 
 
"The Committee has spent considerable time and effort (and continues to do so) examining 
the conditions for the application of this Article, its consequences and the various 
methodologies which may be applied to adjust profits where transactions have been entered 
into on other than arm’s length terms. Its conclusions are set out in the report entitled 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, which is 
periodically updated to reflect the progress of the work of the Committee in this area. That 
report represents internationally agreed principles and provides guidelines for the 
application of the arm’s length principle of which the Article is the authoritative statement."
24
 
 
With regard to the above, the TPG constitute an integral part of the Commentary on Article 9 
of the OECD MTC. The Council laid down the application of the Commentary as an 
independent recommendation to the member countries; therefore, such recommendation 
would apply to the TPG as well. Thus, the TPG must be considered as having the same value 
as source of law as the Commentary for the purposes of applying and interpreting tax 
treaties
25
 Even though, it is not binding under international law, the TPG along with the 
Commentary constitute a primary means of interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention (VCLT).
26
 
 
Following the above mentioned, despite its not binding legal value, the MTC with the 
Commentaries, as well as the TPG are broadly used and aim toward harmonization on the 
way to elimination double taxation, and therefore would be considered in this thesis. 
 
On the other hand, the Discussion Draft presented by OECD does not represent a complete 
draft nor constitutes a part of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. However, together with the 
Transfer Pricing and Intangibles: Scope of the OECD Project 2011, Document approved by 
the Committee of Fiscal Affairs on 25 January 2011, it does represent the intention of the 
OECD towards introducing updates with regard to the guidance in the area of intangibles 
within the TPG.
27
 Thus, the Discussion Draft will be used only as a sideline guide 
introducing some possible issues that may be relevant to intangible related returns. 
                                                 
22
 IBFD, "The Legal Status of the OECD Commentaries" 2008 pg.22-23  
23
 Jens Wittendorff, "Transfer Pricing and the Arm's length principle in the International Tax Law" Kluwer Law 
International 2010, pg. 247 
24
 OECD (2010) Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital; Commentary on 
Article 9 para.1  
25
 Jens Wittendorff, "Transfer Pricing and the Arm's length principle in the International Tax Law" Kluwer Law 
International 2010, pg. 246 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 OECD (2011), Transfer Pricing and Intangibles: Scope of the OECD Project 2011, Document approved by 
the Committee of Fiscal Affairs on 25 January 2011; para. 8 
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1.4 Delimitations 
This thesis is limited to the legal perspective of transfer pricing and intangibles and does not 
investigate any in depth valuation of intangibles nor different methods that are possible to be 
applied when calculating the arm's length prices.  
 
Despite the high importance of the issues arising from the "Interest and Royalty" Directive
28
 
and transfer of royalties,
29
 the thesis does not investigate in depth any problems that might 
arise when allocating royalties nor does examine the Article 12 of the OECD MTC. However, 
some aspects relevant to the entitlement to intangible related returns might be considered.  
 
The thesis will not include separate investigation of any national legislation. The focus is 
being put on the OECD TPG and any possible amendments to it with regard to entitlement to 
intangible related returns. The proposed definition of intangibles will be discussed; however, 
it will not address all the problems related to it. The Article 9 of the OECD MTC will be 
considered. 
  
1.5 Deffinitions 
Arm’s length principle is international standard that OECD member countries have agreed 
should be used for determining transfer prices for tax purposes. It is set forth  
in Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.
30
 
 
An “associated enterprise” is an enterprise that satisfies the conditions set forth in Article 9, 
sub-paragraphs 1a) and 1b) of the OECD Model Tax Convention
31
 
 
Multinational enterprise group (MNE group) is a group of associated companies with 
business establishments in two or more countries.
32
 
 
Multinational enterprise (MNE) is a company that is part of an MNE group.
33
 
 
Transfer prices are the prices at which an enterprise transfers physical goods and intangible 
property or provides services to associated enterprises
34
 
 
                                                 
28
 Directive 2003/49/EC on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made 
between associated companies of different member states 
29
 See Cécile Brokelind, Royalty Payments: Unresolved Issues in the Interest and Royalties Directive, 
EUROPEAN TAXATION MAY 2004, pg. 252-258; Sandra Martinho Fernandes, Roberto Bernales, Suat 
Goeydeniz, Bob Michel, Oana Popa and Emanuela Santoro; A Comprehensive Analysis of Proposals To Amend 
the Interest and Royalties Directive – Part 2; EUROPEAN TAXATION NOVEMBER 2011; pg. 445 - 464 
30
 OECD (2010) Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations; July 2010; 
Glossary, pg. 23 
31
 OECD (2010) Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations; July 2010; 
para. 11 
32
 OECD (2010) Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations; July 2010 
Glossary; page 27 
33
 OECD (2010) Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations; July 2010; 
Glossary; page 27 
34
 OECD (2010) Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations; July 2010; 
para. 11 
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1.6 Outline 
Chapter 2 of the Thesis points out some aspects of the definitions or lack of definitions of 
intangibles and aim to present the concept of intangible related returns and the entitlement to 
it. Potential issues that arise from the definitions are presented. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the relation between the arm's length principle as provided within Article 
9 of the OECD MTC and the entitlement to intangible returns. Following the arm's length 
principle as provided in Article 9 of the OECD MTC, the economic substance of the 
transaction should be considered, as well as the control over the important functions in order 
to provide for entitlement to intangible related return. 
 
Chapter 4 aims to present the factors relevant to the entitlement to intangible related returns 
and the potential conflict between some of the existing provisions of the TPG and the concept 
of entitlement to intangible related returns.  
 
Chapter 5 provides for the transfer pricing issues related to intangible related returns, 
containing the OECD approach towards the concept and aims to discuss the identified 
problems that may arise from the concept.   
 
Chapter 6 contains the conclusion of a necessity for further guidance with regard to the 
entitlement to intangible related returns concept. 
10 
 
2 Definitional aspects of intangibles  
2.1 General comments  
The lack of proper definition of intangibles, and consequently their identification has been to 
some extent a cause for numerous transfer pricing disputes. The current version of the OECD 
TPG does not contain a definition of 'intangibles' for transfer pricing purposes. However, the 
Discussion draft provides for such a definition.
35
 Despite that the term intangible property 
might be considered to be more precise, within this thesis the term 'intangible' will be used as 
referring to intangible property. The term 'property' inter alia refers to something that is 
owned or is capable of being owned, and the definition of the intangibles, as provided with 
the Discussion Draft, refers to something that "is capable of being owned or controlled for 
use in commercial activities"
36
. 
 
Further, another controversial issue for transfer pricing purposes is to determine the parties 
that are entitled to intangible related returns. In order to be able to discuss this issues, it is of 
an importance to understand the concept of intangible related returns following the aim of 
OECD to provide for a certain definition of the term. The OECD scoping document favours 
the concept of economic ownership over the legal ownership, but imposing a right of an 
enterprise to economic benefits derived from an intangible that does not own. However, the 
Discussion draft does not by any means disregard the legal ownership and the compensation 
should be based on the arm's length principle in accordance with the Article 9 of the OECD 
MTC.
37
 
2.2 Definition of intangible  
The importance of shedding some light on the notion of intangibles is highly important for 
transfer pricing purposes. The tax authorities might and in practice usually are intrigued by 
differences in the profit of MNE’s, without there being an empirical evidence available to 
explain this.
38
 The identification and the clear definition of intangibles are of an importance 
for MNE’s in order higher earnings to intangibles to be attributed to a specific member of the 
MNE. However, the concept of intangibles following their specific nature creates problems in 
practice.
39
 There have been various attempts for defying the term intangible property, all 
made dependant of the area of one’s interest, the purpose of the definition, as well as the 
                                                 
35
 OECD (2012), Discussion Draft Revision of the special considerations for intangibles in Chapter VI of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and related provisions 6 June to 14 September 2012; para. 5 
36
 OECD (2012), Discussion Draft Revision of the special considerations for intangibles in Chapter VI of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and related provisions 6 June to 14 September 2012; para. 5 
37
 Loek Helderman and Eduard Sporken; International Revision of the Special Considerations for Intangibles in 
Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Related Provisions; International Transfer Pricing 
Journal, 2012 (Volume 19), No. 6; pg. 385 
38
 Isabel Verlinden and Yoko Mondelaers; International Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles: At the 
Crossroads between Legal, Valuation and Transfer Pricing Issues; Issue: International Transfer Pricing Journal, 
2010 (Volume 17), No. 1; pg.49 
39
 Isabel Verlinden and Yoko Mondelaers; International Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles: At the 
Crossroads between Legal, Valuation and Transfer Pricing Issues; Issue: International Transfer Pricing Journal, 
2010 (Volume 17), No. 1; pg.50 
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country where one is located. That makes the categorization of the intangibles rather 
unclear.
40
 
 
"The TPG currently do not contain a definition of 'intangibles' for transfer pricing 
purposes."
41
 The identification of intangible property as presented in paragraph 6.2 of the 
TPG is that the term “includes rights to use industrial assets such as patents, trademarks, trade 
names, designs or models. It also includes literary and artistic property rights, and intellectual 
property such as know-how and trade secrets.” Such identification made by descriptive listing 
of the most common types of intangibles as seen in paragraph 6.2 of the TPG could be 
insufficient and rather limited and could not replace a definition of intangibles. The latter 
description embraces commercial intangibles, which may be categorised as (i) trade 
intangibles, created through research and development (R&D) activities
42
 and (ii) marketing 
intangibles, containing “trademarks and trade names that support the marketing of a product 
or service customer lists, distribution channels, unique names, symbols or pictures which are 
valuable for marketing of the company’s products.”
43
 Not only that intellectual property 
sometimes cannot be categorised in one of the categories, but also it could be challenging to 
categorize the income arising from one or the other category of intangible.
44
  
 
Contribution to the definition of intangibles within the Discussion draft, the OECD provides 
for intangibles as being “something which is not a physical asset or a financial asset, and 
which is capable of being owned or controlled for use in commercial activities”.
45
 In a matter 
involving intangibles for transfer pricing analysis the determination of the third party 
conditions should be applied, rather than focusing on legal or accounting definitions. 
46
 
 
The OECD states the obvious, that intangibles for transfer pricing purposes are not always 
recognized as intangible assets for accounting purposes.
47
 The value of an intangible is not 
always reflected into the balance sheet as sometimes costs related to creation of intangibles 
are expensed rather than capitalised for accounting purposes. The value of an item and the 
returns that should be attributed to it is affected by the availability and extent of legal, 
contractual, or other forms of protection.
48
 
 
                                                 
40
 Isabel Verlinden and Yoko Mondelaers; International Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles: At the 
Crossroads between Legal, Valuation and Transfer Pricing Issues; Issue: International Transfer Pricing Journal, 
2010 (Volume 17), No. 1; pg.50 
41
 OECD (2011), Transfer Pricing and Intangibles: Scope of the OECD Project 2011, Document approved by 
the Committee of Fiscal Affairs on 25 January 2011; para. 12 
42
OECD (2010) Transfer Pricing Guidelines for MultinationalEnterprises and Tax Administrations, Chapter VI, 
par 6.3. 
43
 OECD (2010) Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, Chapter 
VI, para. 6.4. 
44
 Isabel Verlinden and Yoko Mondelaers; International Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles: At the 
Crossroads between Legal, Valuation and Transfer Pricing Issues; Issue: International Transfer Pricing Journal, 
2010 (Volume 17), No. 1; pg.52 
45
 OECD (2012), Discussion Draft Revision of the special considerations for intangibles in Chapter VI of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and related provisions 6 June to 14 September 2012; para. 5 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 OECD (2012), Discussion Draft Revision of the special considerations for intangibles in Chapter VI of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and related provisions 6 June to 14 September 2012; para. 6 
48
 OECD (2012), Discussion Draft Revision of the special considerations for intangibles in Chapter VI of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and related provisions 6 June to 14 September 2012; para. 7 
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2.3 Definition of intangible related returns 
A compensation for the contribution to the value of intangibles of the various functions, 
assets and risks of the members of the MNE group should be consistent with the intangible 
value they create. The intangible related returns are identified as returns that should follow 
the contribution to the value of intangibles.
49
  
 
The intangible related return to a particular intangible is defined as economic return from 
business operations involving the use of intangible remaining after deduction of costs and 
routine returns. In fact, the costs and expenses related to the business operations and returns 
to business functions, assets other than the particular intangible and risks taking into account 
appropriate comparability adjustments should not be considered when calculating the 
intangible related returns.
50
 
 
The intangible related returns following the contribution to the value of intangibles has not 
been directly addressed within the TPG. The contributions have been regarded in Chapter II 
of the TPG in the contribution analysis used in the profit – split method where the profits are 
divided based upon the relative value of the function performed, assets used and risks 
assumed by each member of the MNE group, following the arm’s length 
principle.
51
However, determining the value of the contribution that each of the associated 
enterprises make to the controlled transaction is challenging.
52
 Chapter VI of the TPG 
provides for guidance on determining the arm’s length consideration for intra-group transfer 
of intangible property however, does not discuss the contribution to the value of intangibles 
by the members of MNE group.
53
 The share of rights in the developed property has been 
discussed within the Cost Contribution Agreement (CCA) Chapter VIII of the TPG, whereas 
the most frequently encountered type of CCA is the one for joint development of intangible 
property. The separate rights obtained may constitute actual legal ownership over the 
intangible or economical ownership when all the participants are co-owners while one of the 
participants is the legal owner.
54
 Under the arm’s length principle, the value of each 
participant’s contribution should be consistent with the value that independent enterprises 
would have assigned to that contribution in comparable circumstances.
55
 The application of 
the arm’s length principle would take into account, the contractual terms and the economic 
circumstances, e.g. the sharing of risks and costs.
56
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The term 'contribution' to the value of the intangible as used in the preamble of the 
Discussion Draft is rather vague, despite its potential significance. As presented in the 
paragraph above, some overlapping relationship with the use of the term 'contribution' is to be 
found in Chapter II of the TPG referring to the profit split method and in Chapter VIII of the 
TPG referring to the cost contribution agreements.  
 
In the context of Chapter II of the TPG, a 'contribution analysis' used in the profit – split 
method where the profits are divided based upon the relative value of the function performed, 
assets used and risks assumed by each member of the MNE group, following the arm’s length 
principle. This provision provides for certain consistency with the intangible related returns 
concept, as the profit split method is suited for situations where both parties contribute 
valuable intangibles and it is highly unlikely that this contributions will not achieve the 
threshold criteria for returns from intangibles as seen by Section B of the Discussion Draft.
57
 
 
At its current version Chapter VIII provides for cash contributions in the intangibles 
developed following a CCA that will potentially result in effective ownership interest.
58
 
However, cash contributions will not fully satisfy the intangible related returns concept. 
Contribution in limited sense may imply to simple bearing of costs.
59
 Section B of the 
Discussion Draft highlights that simple bearing of costs does not give the party entitlement to 
intangible related return, and gives importance to the functions performed, assets used and 
risks borne
 60
 However, even the functions, assets and risks may not by themselves lead to 
intangible related returns unless they are considered relevant for creating a value to the 
intangible and are seen as a contribution themselves.
61
Thus, the need for further clarifications 
of the term contribution would be required in order to shed some light on the intangible 
related return concept. 
 
As per the guidance provided by the Discussion Draft, an attempt to define the attribution of 
returns to intangibles has been made. However, some interpretation issues may arise. The 
term 'economic return' is rather new in the TPG and most likely applies to the profit or loss 
attributable of particular intangible, but that is not clearly stated.
62
  
 
The definition also, refers only to the use of intangibles, but not to their transfer. It may 
suggest that the attribution of intangible related returns should only refer to transactions 
involving the use of intangibles where there is not transfer; however that will leave the issue 
of transfer transactions pending when it comes to attribution of intangible related returns. The 
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returns with respect to an intangible may be positive, negative, or zero.
63
 Тhe assessment of 
entitlements to intangible related return should be made in an objective manner, irrespective 
of whether it leads to the sharing of a profit or loss, following that the practice in loss-making 
situations some tax authorities claim that a guaranteed profit should be attributed to a member 
of a MNE group.
64
  
 
2.4 Entitlement to intangible related returns 
The concept of intangible related returns suggests that such returns should follow the 
contributions to the value of the intangibles, as mentioned in the point 2.3 of this Thesis. The 
concept may be omitted by following the approach to requiring the various functions, assets 
and risks of the MNE members to be consistent with the intangible value they create.
65
  
 
According to the OECD, when determining which members of the MNE group are entitled to 
intangible related returns, the following factors should be considered: (i) the legal contractual 
terms (ii) the alignment of functional contributions with the legal rights and (iii) whether 
services rendered within the MNE group in relation to developing, enhancing, maintaining 
and protecting intangibles are compensated on arm's length basis.
66
  
 
Having the definition of intangibles as 'capable of being owned and controlled' and the 
concept of intangible related returns in mind, there are 'concepts' than need to be further 
considered as may be deemed relevant for the entitlement to intangible related returns. 
 
The 'concept of ownership' embraces both legal and economic ownership. Identifying the 
owner of the intangibles is the first step to determine the arm’s length transfer prices, but also 
may reflect the entitlement to the economic benefits arising from the intangible. The TPG do 
not provide for clear guidance with regard to establishing the owner of the intangibles. 
However, they stress the importance of the ownership over the legal rights of the intangibles, 
managed by contracts and licenses, and the ownership related to the contribution to the 
development of high-value intangibles made by members of the MNE group, legal ownership 
and economic ownership, accordingly.
67
 The legal ownerships in terms of the contractual 
agreement, which illustrates the intention of the contracting parties of the ownership 
allocation, should be the starting point to the ownership analysis. With respect to intangibles 
that can be registered or protected, the ownership as manifested in those registers usually 
corresponds to the ownership as provided within the contractual agreement. However, the 
MNE group member entitled as a registered owner is by far of a less importance between the 
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members of the group, unlike it is between unrelated parties. Consequently, the registration as 
a manifest for the legal ownership is not necessarily as strong within the group.
68
  
 
The 'economic ownership' follows the contribution to the development of the intangibles, and 
the return of such contribution is obtained in addition to any functional activity performed. 
The parties performing and controlling part or all the functions and bearing or controlling part 
or all of the risks, will be entitled to part or all of the intangible related returns.
69
 This implies 
that neither legal ownership, nor the bearing of costs related to intangible development, taken 
separately or together, entitle an entity within an MNE group to retain the benefits or returns 
with respect to intangibles. The latter has been provided within the Discussion draft as well.
70
 
Such view of the legal ownership and bearing of the costs tends to depart from the arm's 
length principle and Chapter IX of the TPG.
71
 On one hand, the OECD provides for the 
importance to consider which entities have born the relevant costs, when evaluating the 
entitlement to intangible related returns, and on the other hand, when it comes to the 
development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of intangibles bearing the costs, in 
and of itself, does not create an entitlement to intangible related returns. Nevertheless, the 
costs incurred within the development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of 
intangibles should play an important role.
72
 
 
The legal ownership over the intangible should be respected unless it clearly deviates from 
the 'economic substance' of the transaction and the conduct of the parties. In cases of such 
deviation from the legal arrangement, the objective should be to determine what a reasonable 
allocation between unrelated parties would be in the respective circumstances. In effect, 
similarities can be withdrawn from the allocation of risks concept and the allocation of 
intangible related returns, expressing the need for balance between peoples functions and 
capital, cost bearing and legal ownership.
73
 The risk allocation is a significant part of the 
functional analysis and has already been established within the provisions of Chapter IX of 
TPG.  
 
The 'concept of control over the functions' is considered relevant for the entitlement to 
intangible related returns. The concept of control implies to key decision making and risk 
taking activities. Following a quite extensive description the Discussion Draft in some cases 
points to physically performing certain key functions, as well as listing examples that 
demonstrate a capacity to make strategic decisions, “design”, “control” and “manage” key 
functions such as R&D programs and related budgets, “protect” the rights in intangibles, and 
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maintain quality control over others that have been delegated to implement decisions and 
perform functions in a subordinate role.
74
 The draft proposes that although the costs incurred 
to perform those important functions regarding intangibles should be borne by the parties 
claiming entitlement to the intangible-related returns, the ‘bearing of the costs related to the 
development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of the intangibles does not, in and of 
itself, create an entitlement to intangible returns.’ Such perception of the cost bearing may 
depart from the arm's length principle.  
 
In short, as per the OECD, a member of an MNE group is to be entitled to intangible related 
returns if in substance: (i) performs and controls important functions related to the 
development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of the intangibles; (ii) bears the risks 
and costs related to developing and enhancing the intangible and (iii) bear and control risks 
and costs associated with maintaining and protecting its entitlement to intangible related 
returns.
75
 However, the concept of intangible related returns as presented within the 
Discussion Draft does not make a clear difference between the entitlement to intangible 
related returns from intangibles already developed and the entitlement to intangible related 
returns from new intangible development. The entitlement to returns from fully developed 
intangibles subsequently transferred in an arm’s length transaction is mostly unclear and 
misleading. 
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3 The Arm’s length principle and 
Intangible related returns 
3.1 General comments  
In order to successfully apply the arm's length principle to transactions related returns arising 
from intangibles, assessment to what unrelated parties do or would have done in comparable 
circumstances should be considered. Following the arm's length principle as provided in 
Article 9 of the OECD MTC, the economic substance of the transaction should be considered, 
as well as the control over the important functions in order to provide for entitlement to 
intangible related return. 
3.2 The arm’s length principle 
The arm's length principle as provided within the TPG is an international transfer pricing 
standard set forward in the Article 9 of the OECD MTC.
76
 The Arm's length principle has 
been defined as: 
 
" [Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two [associated] enterprises in their 
commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between 
independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued 
to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be 
included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly."
77
 
 
When associated enterprises tract with each other, the possibility to determine prices of goods 
or services may not be directly influenced by the market forces and therefore may deviate 
from the actual market prices, which is unlikely to happen between independent parties. 
However, that does not by default imply that associated enterprises have sought to manipulate 
their profits as there may be a genuine difficulty to determine the actual market price in the 
absence of market forces between associated enterprises.
78
 
 
This general guidance of the arm's length principle apply for determining the transfer prices 
between associated parties for intangibles as well, however the practice has shown that in the 
case of intangible related transactions it is challenging for the arm's length principle to be 
applied.
79
 
 
When examining if certain transaction is at arm's length, the tax administration should regard 
the actual transaction undertaken. Only in extraordinary circumstances the transaction may be 
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re-characterized by the tax administration.
80
 The terms of the contract play a major role into 
determining the actual transaction undertaken, but may not suffice to prove it.
81
 The 
contractual allocation of entitlement to intangible related returns despite the contractual terms 
and registrations being in accordance with the functions, risks and costs, may be disregarded 
by the tax authorities, which may potentially lead to double taxation or double non-taxation
82
 
 
3.3 Intangible related returns at arm’s length 
The interpretation and implementation of the arm's length principle as set out in Article 9 of 
the OECD MTC is and should be supported by the provisions of the TPG. Departure from the 
arm's length principle would create certain legal concerns regarding the application of the 
TPG in interpreting bilateral tax treaties and increase the risk of potential double taxation. 
When it comes to dealing with allocation of intangible related returns, neither the current 
version of the TPG nor the Discussion Draft to Chapter VI provide for a clear reference to 
what independent parties would do, that would guide MNE's and tax authorities for 
implementation of the arm's length principle. Furthermore, when analysing the Discussion 
Draft text, despite the clear statement that "does not reflect an intention to depart from the 
principles of Article 9"
83
, it may be interpreted as departing from the arm's length principle, 
following the proposition that the ownership and bearing the costs of the development of the 
intangible cannot be determining factors in allocating intangible related returns without the 
performance of, or control over, functions related to the activities of development, 
enhancement, maintenance and protection of the intangible.  
 
The transactions between unrelated parties regarding legal ownership and function control 
could establish balance to transaction between associated parties, by providing guidance with 
regard to the issues concerning entitlement to intangible related returns. The starting point to 
analysing transactions is to certain extent developed in Chapter IX of the TPG when referring 
to the allocation of risks. A two step process for ascertaining the arm's length allocation of 
risks is been developed including: (i) determining the alignment of the economic substance 
with the contractual terms and (ii) determining if the arrangements would have been adopted 
by independent enterprises in comparable situations.
84
 The economic substance concept is 
relevant for the arm's length principle and with regard to the intangible related returns should 
follow the provisions of the TPG as provided in paragraphs 1.64-1.69. Further, the factors 
than need to be considered when determining the arm's length principle should be the ability 
to control and bear the risks. If there is a reliable evidence of an allocation of intangible 
related returns between unrelated parties it should be considered into such allocation between 
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ssociated enterprises. Only in case when such evidence could not be provided, the intangible 
related returns may be assessed by the relevant factors as set out above.
85
 
 
In short, introducing a clear reference to what independent parties would do in comparable 
circumstances regarding allocation of intangible related returns might be needed and it should 
be linked to evidenced allocation of intangible related returns between unrelated parties. In 
case of a absence of such evidence, the allocation that would have been expected to be 
performed should be considered; respectively the performing of the functions, bearing the 
risks and the costs should be considered.  
  
 
                                                 
85
 OECD (2012) The Comments received with respect to the Discussion Draft Revision of the special 
considerations for intangibles in Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and related provisions; 
29 October 2012 pg.349 
20 
 
4 Factors relevant to the entitlement to 
intangible related returns  
4.1 General comments  
According to the OECD, the key factors when determining the entitlement to intangible 
related returns are (i) the legal contractual terms (ii) the alignment of functional contributions 
with the legal rights and (iii) whether services rendered within the MNE group in relation to 
developing, enhancing, maintaining and protecting intangibles are compensated on arm's 
length basis.
86
 
 
4.2 The terms of the legal arrangements 
The analysis of the entitlement to intangible related returns should have the legal 
arrangements, respectively legal registrations and contractual arrangements, as a starting 
point of such entitlement.
87
 However, the legal arrangements should not lack of economic 
substance of the transaction or the arrangement and the contractual relationship between the 
parties should be supported by their actual conduct.
88
 
 
4.2.1 Overview of relevant TPG provisions  
Contractual arrangements are the starting point for determining which party to a transaction 
bears the risk associated with it.
89
 The contractual terms generally define how risks are to be 
divided by the parties, and the examination of the risks in an Article 9 of OECD MTC 
context, starts from examination of the contractual terms.
90
 Should the contractual terms not 
be stated in written, the contractual relationship of the parties must be deducted from their 
conduct and the economic principles that generally govern relationships between independent 
enterprises.
91
 The contractual allocation of risk should be consistent with the economic 
substance of the transaction.
92
 
 
Following the concept of intangible related returns, a related party may be entitled to 
intangible related returns should it incurred significant risk and expenses related to the 
development of enhancement of the value of the intangible, despite the fact of not being an 
owner of the intangible. The TPG provide for a support to the above with regard to marketing 
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activities undertaken by enterprises that do not owe the trademarks or the trade names. In 
order to determine whether the marketer is entitled to intangible related returns, the rights and 
obligations implied by the agreement between the parties should be referred to.
93
 In case 
where the distributor bears the costs for the marketing activities without them being 
reimbursed to him by the owner of the marketing intangible, has the right to share the 
benefits of the increased value of the intangible at arm’s length based on the substance of the 
rights, which most commonly are defined in the agreement between the parties.
94
 In such 
cases the legal ownership is not disregarded neither by the Article 9 of the OECD MTC nor 
by the TPG. 
 
Tax authorities should not disregard the contractual terms and the actual transactions or 
substitute other transactions for them, in other than exception circumstances, such as where 
where (i) the economic substance of a transaction (i.e. capital) differs from its form (i.e. loan) 
or (ii) while the form and substance of the transaction are the same, the arrangements made in 
relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would have been 
adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner.
 95
 
 
4.2.2 Conclusion 
The contractual arrangement, which illustrates the intention of the contracting parties of the 
ownership allocation, should be the starting point to the ownership analysis. With respect to 
intangibles that can be registered or protected, the ownership as manifested in those registers 
usually corresponds to the ownership as provided within the contractual agreement. However, 
the MNE group member entitled as a registered owner is by far of a less importance between 
the members of the group, unlike it is between unrelated parties. Consequently, the 
registration as a manifest for the legal ownership is not necessarily as strong within the MNE 
group.
96
 Further, it is generally possible to identify which amongst the related parties is the 
legal owner of a legally protected asset. However, despite not being entitled with the legal 
ownership over the intangible, a related party may be entitled to intangible related returns 
should it incurred significant risk and expenses related to the development of enhancement of 
the value of the intangible.
97
  
 
Thus, the parties conduct should be in accordance with the contractual terms. For transfer 
pricing purposes, where the relevant registrations and contractual arrangements are in 
alignment with the conduct of the parties, the entity that is entitled to use and to exclude other 
to use the intangible, is the one that is entitled to intangible related returns of the respective 
intangible.
98
 The focus is given to the use of the intangible, respectively the entity which uses 
the intangible with regard to the entitlement to intangible related returns in case when the 
conduct of the parties is in alignment with the contractual arrangements. The conduct of the 
parties however is not sufficiently defined and may lead to re-characterization of a 
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transaction at will by the tax authorities and eventually lead to double taxation or double non-
taxation. 
 
4.3 Alignment of functional contributions with legal 
rights 
 
The Discussion Draft stresses the importance of the conduct of the parties and its alignment 
with the terms of the registrations or contracts for the purpose of evaluating which members 
of an MNE group are entitled to intangible related returns. In order for the conduct to be 
examined it is necessary the functions, risks, and costs related to the development, 
enhancement, maintenance and protection of the intangibles to be considered.
99
 Where the 
conduct of the parties is not in line with the contractual terms, all or part of the intangible 
related returns should be attributed to the entities that perform the functions, bear the risks 
and bear the costs that relate to development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of 
the intangibles. Thus, a primacy has been given to the conduct of the parties.
100
 In substance, 
the member of a MNE group will be entitled to intangible related return should it (i)perform 
and control important functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance and 
protection of the intangible property and control other related functions performed by other 
parties that are compensated on an arm’ s length basis; (ii)bear and control the risks and costs 
related to developing and enhancing the intangible property; and (iii) bear and control risks 
and costs associated with maintaining and protecting its entitlement to intangible property-
related returns.
101
  
 
4.3.1 Overview of relevant TPG provisions  
In examining the risk allocation between associated enterprises and its transfer pricing 
consequences, it is important to review not only the contractual terms but, amongst other, the 
conduct of the parties and whether it is in alignment with the contractual allocation of 
risks.
102
 The examination of whether the actual conduct of the related parties confirms to the 
terms of the contract is of importance following that in case of independent parties they will 
seek to hold each other to the terms of the contract.
103
 
 
The examination of risks in the context of the functional analysis is found at paragraphs 1.47-
1.51 of the TPG. The examination of the arm's length of a transaction of the risk allocation 
should be compared to uncontrolled transaction in similar circumstances. Where no 
comparables are found where no comparables are found to support a contractual allocation of 
risk between associated enterprises, it should be determined whether that might be expected 
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to be agreed upon between unrelated parties. The notion of control over risk and the financial 
capacity to assume risk has been developed by the TPG to serve the purpose of the latter.
104
 
 
A tax administration is entitled to challenge the alleged contractual allocation of risk between 
associated enterprises if it is not consistent with the 'economic substance' of the transaction. 
"A purported allocation of risk between associated enterprises is respected only to the extent 
that it is consistent with the economic substance of the transaction."
105
 Therefore, the conduct 
of the parties should be examined to acknowledge whether it conforms to the risk allocation. 
However, the re-characterization of the actual transaction undertaken is limited to exceptional 
cases.
106
 In such exceptional cases, "the examination of a controlled transaction ordinarily 
should be based on the transaction actually undertaken by the associated enterprises as it has 
been structured by them"
107
. 
 
On the other hand, the concept of 'economic ownership', despite the lack of precise definition, 
is introduced in relation to cost contribution arrangements, and may not always follow the 
legal ownership over the intangible that would result in a license or similar agreement. The 
cost contribution agreement for joint development of intangible property usually provides for 
separate rights to exploit the intangible property to each participant.
108
 This separate rights 
may constitute an actual legal ownership, which would entitle one participant as a legal 
owner of the intangible, but economically all the participants are co-owners.
109
  
4.3.2 Conclusion 
The legal ownership over the intangible should be respected unless it clearly deviates from 
the economic substance of the transaction and the conduct of the parties. In cases of such 
deviation from the legal arrangement, the objective should be to determine what a reasonable 
allocation between unrelated parties would be in the respective circumstances. The 
Discussion Draft gives primacy to the conduct of the parties, focusing on the physical 
performance through its own employees of the important functions related to the 
development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of the intangibles, in case when 
functions are in alignment with the claims to intangible related returns. In practice, however, 
such functions and activities between unrelated parties may be outsourced or subcontracted, 
with a clear legal arrangement of the ownership of the subsequently developed intangible.
110
 
Not recognizing such right to associated enterprises would deviate from the arm's length 
principle and could potentially lead to double taxation.  
 
The principles developed by Chapter IX of the TPG regarding the risks and control may be 
appropriate to be followed in case of the entitlement to intangible related returns. The concept 
of control of risks is proposed to be relevant when determining the party entitled to intangible 
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related returns. This concept clearly states the importance of active control as a criterion for 
assessment of the entitlement to intangible related returns. In line with this, the Discussion 
Draft states that bearing costs related to the development, enhancement, maintenance and 
protection of intangible related returns does not, in and of itself, create an entitlement to 
intangible related returns”
111
 This in a way shades some light over the intangible ownership, 
especially to the notion of economic ownership which tends to be in favour of the parties who 
have funded the intangible related costs.
112
 It should be noted that the notion of control of 
risks as stated within the paragraph 47 of the Discussion Draft by large extent contradicts the 
basic principles of Cost Contribution Agreements, where the contributions made, entitle the 
party to share of the intangible related returns. In such case parties might not actively control 
the activities. Therefore, a clear distinction must be made between the active control over the 
intangible activity and the passive participants in the CCA, otherwise Chapter VIII of the 
TPG would be made inoperable.
113
 
 
However, the specificity of the CCA by which each participant shares the expected benefits 
(determined ex-ante) in correlation with its contribution, may not be applied by analogy to 
the concept of entitlement to intangible related returns.
114
 In cases between unrelated parties, 
it is common that only one of the factors will be taken into consideration, and that is less 
likely to be the economics of the transaction as opposed to registrations held and contract 
entered into.
115
 
 
In this context, when adopting the notion of control over risks certain caution should be taken 
in relation to the research and development activities, respectively the activities of creating 
intangible assets. Outsourcing of the research and development by way of contract R&D is 
done in practice between independent parties following the lack of competence of the 
principal to conduct such functions. In that sense, apart from some high management control, 
no other control over the could be established. Therefore, the meaning of the term control 
might be crucial. Despite the fact that the contractor/service provider is using its particular 
competence to decide how to reach the objectives outlined, should not influence the 
allocation of the intangibles for TP-purposes and the attribution of intangible returns.
116
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4.4 Arm’s length compensation for services rendered  
Determining whether certain types of activities result in an entitlement of intangible related 
returns or should receive and arm's length payment for the services provided is considered to 
be important issue. Condition for concluding that the contractual and other arrangements of 
an MNE group are aligned with the conduct of the parties is that the parties that do not claim 
entitlement to intangible related returns, should be provided with an arm's length 
compensation for the functions they perform.
117
 An important issue in that sense is whether 
the marketer/distributor should be compensated as a service provider, i.e. for providing 
promotion and distribution services, or whether he should share in any present and future 
intangible related returns attributable to the trademarks and related intangibles.
118
 The 
analysis of this issue requires assessment of the obligations and rights implied by the legal 
registrations and agreements between the parties, of the functions undertaken, the risks 
assumed, the assets used, and the costs incurred by the parties, and of the compensation 
provided for the functions, risks, assets and costs of the marketer/distributor.
119
 The same 
principles apply to the performance of R&D functions by a member of an MNE group.
120
 
 
4.4.1 Overview of relevant TPG provisions  
The expected return for performing distribution activities would differ in case the distributor 
overtakes the responsibility and bears the risk for marketing and advertising activities than 
the one where such responsibility is not undertaken. In the former the return would be 
expected to be higher. The distributor acting merely as an agent would usually be reimbursed 
for its costs and would be expected to receive income appropriate for its activity. Limited 
return would be provided to the contract manufacturer or researcher that do not bear any 
meaningful risk.
121
 For applying the arm's length principle to controlled transactions, the 
comparability analyses as provided within the paragraphs 1.33 - 1.37 should be considered.  
The comparability factors deemed important as per OECD include the (i) "characteristics of 
the property or services transferred", (ii) "the functions performed by the parties (taking into 
account assets used and risks assumed)", (iii) "the contractual terms", (iv) "the economic 
circumstances of the parties", and the (v) "business strategies pursued by the parties."
122
 
The selection and the application of the most appropriate transfer pricing method is been 
provided within Chapter II of the TPG and it should be considered for its application on case 
by case basis. 
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4.4.2 Conclusion 
The situation is somewhat clear in case of an agent, controlled by the entity that is entitled to 
intangible related returns and being reimbursed for the activities performed as he does not 
bear or control the risks associated with the development of the trademark or other 
intangibles. Less obvious is a situation of a distributor. Entitlement to market share of the 
profits derived from the use of the trademark, will depend on the substance of the rights of 
the party, respectively the distributor may have the ability to obtain benefits made dependant 
of the functions performed, risks borne and costs incurred in the development of the value of 
the intangible. Such share of the profits does not lead to ownership over the marketing 
intangible, respectively it could not be by default translated into something capable of being 
owned and controlled.
123
 
 
The situation of intangibles developed through R&D is deemed to be more complex. 
However, Discussion Draft sheds more light on the type of activities that do not result in an 
entitlement to intangible property-related returns if the intangibles are developed through 
R&D activities for transfer pricing purposes. The entitlement to intangible related returns 
should be made dependent on case by case basis and should follow the way of independent 
parties operate at arm's length. The entitlement to intangible related return by no meaning 
should be considered as default, as it may be reflected as remuneration for manufacturing or 
charged as service provision.
124
 In case when the parent company conduct all the research 
and development, and its wholly owned subsidiary performs the patent administration work, 
but has no technical personnel for R&D nor incurs any of the R&D expenses, it is not entitled 
to intangible related returns. In such case, the subsidiary is entitled to a payment for the 
services provided and not to intangible related returns because (i) neither bears nor controls 
risks related to intangible property development or enhancement; and (ii)it does not perform 
or control any functions related to intangible property development or enhancement and does 
not bear any expenses related to the development or enhancement of intangible property.
125
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5 Transfer pricing issues related to 
intangible related returns 
5.1 General comments 
The introduction of the concept of entitlement to intangible related returns it may be deemed 
of an importance and it is to shed some light over the issues related to intangibles and the 
split of the profits arising from intangibles. This chapter attempts to canalize the OECD 
approach and point out the issues that may arise in relation to it, and canalize issues identified 
in the previous chapters of the thesis. 
 
5.2 The OECD approach 
Chapter VI is to provide guidance specially tailored to determining arm’s length conditions 
for transactions that involve the use or transfer of intangibles. The key consideration is 
whether a transaction conveys economic value from one associated enterprise to another, 
whether that benefit derives from tangible property, intangibles, services or other items or 
activities.
126
 Following the lack of definition of the term 'intangible' the OECD makes an 
attempt to define and shed some light over it, rather than focusing on accounting or legal 
definitions , the important transfer pricing issue would be the determination of the conditions 
agreed between unrelated parties. In that sense, the word 'intangible' is intended to address 
something which is not a physical asset or a financial asset capable of being owned or 
controlled.
127
 The intangible related return to a particular intangible is defined as economic 
return from business operations involving the use of intangible remaining after deduction of 
costs and routine returns. In fact, the costs and expenses related to the business operations 
and returns to business functions, assets other than the particular intangible and risks taking 
into account appropriate comparability adjustments should not be considered when 
calculating the intangible related returns.
128
 The functions performed, assets used, and risks 
assumed by the parties are deemed relevant for transfer pricing purposes. This suggests that 
neither legal ownership, nor the bearing of costs related to intangible development, taken 
separately or together, entitles an entity within an MNE group to retain the benefits or returns 
with respect to intangibles without more.
129
 
 
Legal registrations and contractual arrangements are the starting point for determining which 
members of an MNE group are entitled to intangible related returns and if such do not exist 
should be driven out of the conduct and the economic principles that generally govern 
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relationships between independent enterprises.
130
 For transfer pricing purposes, where the 
relevant registrations and contractual arrangements are in alignment with the conduct of the 
parties, the entity that is entitled to use and to exclude other to use the intangible, is the one 
that is entitled to intangible related returns of the respective intangible.
131
 Where the conduct 
of the parties is not in line with the contractual terms, all or part of the intangible related 
returns should be attributed to the entities that perform the functions, bear the risks and bear 
the costs that relate to development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of the 
intangibles. Thus, a primacy has been given to the conduct of the parties.
132
 When evaluating 
the alignment between a contractual claim to entitlement to all or part of the intangible 
related returns attributable to an intangible, and the conduct of the parties, examination of 
functions, risks and costs related to the development, enhancement, maintenance and 
protection of the intangibles is necessary. 
133
 In substance, the member of a MNE group will 
be entitled to intangible related return should it (i)perform and control important functions 
related to the development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of the intangible 
property and control other related functions performed by other parties that are compensated 
on an arm’ s length basis; (ii)bear and control the risks and costs related to developing and 
enhancing the intangible property; and (iii) bear and control risks and costs associated with 
maintaining and protecting its entitlement to intangible property-related returns.
134
 
 
5.3 Definitional aspects  
The TPG currently do not contain a definition of 'intangibles' for transfer pricing purposes.  
The identification of intangible property as presented in paragraph 6.2 of the TPG is that the 
term "includes rights to use industrial assets such as patents, trademarks, trade names, designs 
or models. It also includes literary and artistic property rights, and intellectual property such 
as know-how and trade secrets." Such identification made by descriptive listing of the most 
common types of intangibles as seen in paragraph 6.2 of the TPG could be insufficient and 
rather limited and could not replace a definition of intangibles. The latter description 
embraces commercial intangibles, which may be categorised as (i) trade intangibles, created 
through research and development (R&D) activities and (ii) marketing intangibles, containing 
"trademarks and trade names that support the marketing of a product or service customer 
lists, distribution channels, unique names, symbols or pictures which are valuable for 
marketing of the company’s products."  
 
The definition of intangibles the Discussion Draft as stated above, is a very broad and does 
not attempt to define in detail all the potential classes or categories of intangibles. It also 
deviates from the term "intangible property" which has been settled with the current Chapter 
VI of the TPG, but however following that the intangible can be owned, controlled or 
transferred it in fact is a property. However, that is not clearly stated.  
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The intangible related return to a particular intangible is defined as economic return from 
business operations involving the use of intangible remaining after deduction of costs and 
routine returns. In fact, the costs and expenses related to the business operations and returns 
to business functions, assets other than the particular intangible and risks taking into account 
appropriate comparability adjustments should not be considered when calculating the 
intangible related returns.
135
 The concept of intangible related returns should follow the 
contribution to the value of intangibles. However, the term 'contribution' to the value of the 
intangible as used in the preamble of the Discussion Draft is rather vague, despite its potential 
significance. Some overlapping relationship with the use of the term 'contribution' is to be 
found in Chapter II of the TPG referring to the profit split method and in Chapter VIII of the 
TPG referring to the cost contribution agreements.  
5.4 Legal and economic ownership 
Having the concept of intangible related returns in mind, the concept of legal/economic 
ownership should be further considered as may be deemed relevant for the entitlement to 
intangible related returns. 
 
The legal ownerships in terms of the contractual agreement, which illustrates the intention of 
the contracting parties of the ownership allocation, should be the starting point to the 
ownership analysis. With respect to intangibles that can be registered or protected, the 
ownership as manifested in those registers usually corresponds to the ownership as provided 
within the contractual agreement. Within a MNE group it is possible that despite the 
contribution of more companies only one company retains the legal rights. Therefore, the 
MNE group member entitled as a registered owner is by far of a less importance between the 
members of the group, unlike it is between unrelated parties. Consequently, the registration as 
a manifest for the legal ownership is not necessarily as strong within the group.
136
  
 
Thus, for transfer pricing purposes the concept of economic ownership of a increasing 
importance. The concept of economic ownership, despite the lack of precise definition, is 
introduced in relation to cost contribution arrangements, and may not always follow the legal 
ownership over the intangible that would result in a license or similar agreement.
137
 In that 
sense, the economic ownership follows the contribution to the development of the 
intangibles, and the return of such contribution is obtained in addition to any functional 
activity performed. The parties performing and controlling part or all the functions and 
bearing or controlling part or all of the risks, will be entitled to part or all of the intangible 
related returns.
138
 However, the concept of economic ownership could not as simply be 
transferred to the concept of intangible related returns. An important issue in that sense is 
whether the marketer/distributor should be compensated as a service provider, or as a party 
entitled to intangible related returns. The analysis of this issue requires assessment, not only 
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to functions undertaken, the risks assumed, the assets used, but of the obligations and rights 
implied by the legal registrations and agreements between the parties and the costs incurred 
by the parties. 
 
Not regarding the legal ownership and bearing of the costs tends to depart from the arm's 
length principle and Chapter IX of the TPG.
139
 Clear reference to the position, that allocation 
of intangible related returns should be consistent with an allocation that was agreed upon two 
arm’s length parties in the circumstances, should be provided to support the arm’s length 
allocation between related parties. Without such reference the concept of economic 
ownership over the legal relationships, which may lead to potential re-characterization 
outside the strict guidance as provided with TPG (para. 1.64 – 1.69) and potentially lead to 
double taxation or double non-taxation. 
 
5.5 Legal and economic substance 
Legal registrations and contractual arrangements are the starting point for determining which 
members of an MNE group are entitled to intangible related returns and if such do not exist 
should be driven out of the conduct and the economic principles that generally govern 
relationships between independent enterprises.
140
 However, the legal arrangements should not 
lack of economic substance of the transaction or the arrangement and the contractual 
relationship between the parties should be supported by their actual conduct.
141
 
 
The legal ownership over the intangible should be respected unless it clearly deviates from 
the economic substance of the transaction and the conduct of the parties. In cases of such 
deviation from the legal arrangement, the objective should be to determine what a reasonable 
allocation between unrelated parties would be in the respective circumstances. 
 
Tax authorities should not disregard the contractual terms and the actual transactions or 
substitute other transactions for them, in other than exception circumstances, such as where 
where (i) the economic substance of a transaction (i.e. capital) differs from its form (i.e. loan) 
or (ii) while the form and substance of the transaction are the same, the arrangements made in 
relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would have been 
adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner.
 142
 When 
examining if certain transaction is at arm's length, the tax administration should regard the 
actual transaction undertaken. Only in extraordinary circumstances the transaction may be re-
characterized by the tax administration. The terms of the contract play a major role into 
determining the actual transaction undertaken, but may not suffice to prove it. The 
contractual allocation of entitlement to intangible related returns despite the contractual terms 
and registrations being in accordance with the functions, risks and costs, may be disregarded 
by the tax authorities, which may potentially lead to double taxation or double non-taxation. 
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5.6 Control of risks (functions)  
In substance, the member of a MNE group will be entitled to intangible related return should 
it (i)perform and control important functions related to the development, enhancement, 
maintenance and protection of the intangible property and control other related functions 
performed by other parties that are compensated on an arm’s length basis; (ii)bear and control 
the risks and costs related to developing and enhancing the intangible property; and (iii) bear 
and control risks and costs associated with maintaining and protecting its entitlement to 
intangible property-related returns.
143
 
 
The parties performing the functions and bearing the risks, as well as bearing the costs related 
to the development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of the intangibles are entitled 
to obtain profits attributable to intangibles. However, passive bearing of costs related to the 
development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of a party does not create entitlement 
to intangible related returns. The “concept of control over the functions” is considered 
relevant for the entitlement to intangible related returns. The concept of control implies to 
key decision making and risk taking activities. Following a quite extensive description the 
Discussion Draft in some cases points to physically performing certain key functions. 
 
The starting point to analysing transactions is to certain extent developed in Chapter IX of the 
TPG when referring to the allocation of risks. The arm's length allocation of risks is also 
related to determining if the arrangements would have been adopted by independent 
enterprises in comparable situations.
144
 The factors than need to be considered when 
determining the arm's length principle should be the ability to control and bear the risks. This 
concept might be useful with transactions involving intangibles. If there is a reliable evidence 
of an allocation of intangible related returns between unrelated parties it should be considered 
into such allocation between associated enterprises. Only in case when such evidence could 
not be provided, the intangible related returns may be assessed by other relevant factors.
145
 
 
It should be noted that the notion of control of risks by large extent contradicts the basic 
principles of Cost Contribution Agreements, where the contributions made entitle the party to 
share of the intangible related returns. In such case parties might not actively control the 
activities. Therefore, a clear distinction must be made between the active control over the 
intangible activity and the passive participants in the CCA, otherwise Chapter VIII of the 
TPG would be made inoperable.
146
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 General comments 
The OECD TPG aims to support both taxpayers and tax administration when facing a transfer 
pricing difficulties by offering mutually acceptable solutions to transfer pricing problems and 
to lead to a consensus of the interpretation of the arm's length principle as provided in Article 
9 of the OECD MTC. TPG are broadly used and aim toward harmonization on the way to 
elimination double taxation. Therefore, it is of an importance that the TPG provide for a 
consistence and clear guidelines with regard to transfer pricing issues. The importance of 
shedding some light on the notion of intangibles is highly important for transfer pricing 
purposes. Further to this, introducing the concept of entitlement of intangible related returns 
should support the intention of OECD of overcoming transfer pricing difficulties in cases of 
transfer of intangibles. However, in order for the goals to be achieved, the coherence with the 
already established provisions and consistence within the TPG text should be achieved.  
6.2 Issues related to the definitions 
A definition of intangibles for transfer pricing purposes is not being provided for within the 
current version of TPG. Instead, identification of the intangibles has been made by 
descriptive listing of the most common types. Contribution to the definition of intangibles 
within the Discussion draft, the OECD provides for intangibles as being "something which is 
not a physical asset or a financial asset, and which is capable of being owned or controlled for 
use in commercial activities". The definition of intangibles the Discussion Draft as stated 
above, is very broad and does not attempt to define in detail all the potential classes or 
categories of intangibles. It may be convenient to make a distinction between situations that 
include transfer of valuable intangibles in opposite to the ones that do not include such.  
 
By providing cleared definition of intangibles, the concept of intangible related returns 
following the contribution to the value of intangibles, would be made clearer. However, the 
term 'contribution' to the value of the intangible as used in the preamble of the Discussion 
Draft is rather vague, despite its potential significance. Some overlapping relationship with 
the use of the term 'contribution' is to be found in Chapter II of the TPG referring to the profit 
split method and in Chapter VIII of the TPG referring to the cost contribution agreements. 
Determining the value of the contribution that each of the associated enterprises make to the 
controlled transaction is challenging. The functions, assets and risks may not by themselves 
lead to intangible related returns unless they are considered relevant for creating a value to 
the intangible and are seen as a contribution themselves. Thus, the need for further 
clarifications of the term contribution would be required in order to shed some light on the 
intangible related return concept. 
 
The lack of clear definitions may lead to missguidance to the tax authorities and the tax 
payers, and pottential discrepances and differences in the interpretation of the unclear 
definition.  
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6.3 The need for clarifications 
Within a MNE group it is possible that despite the contribution of more companies only one 
company retains the legal rights. Therefore, the MNE group member entitled as a registered 
owner is by far of a less importance between the members of the group, unlike it is between 
unrelated parties. Consequently, the registration as a manifest for the legal ownership is not 
necessarily as strong within the group. Thus, for transfer pricing purposes the concept of 
economic ownership of a increasing importance. The concept of economic ownership, despite 
the lack of precise definition, is introduced in relation to cost contribution arrangements, and 
may not always follow the legal ownership over the intangible that would result in a license 
or similar agreement. However, the concept of economic ownership could not as simply be 
transferred to the concept of intangible related returns. An important issue in that sense is 
whether the marketer/distributor should be compensated as a service provider, or as a party 
entitled to intangible related returns. The analysis of this issue requires assessment, not only 
to functions undertaken, the risks assumed, the assets used, but of the obligations and rights 
implied by the legal registrations and agreements between the parties and the costs incurred 
by the parties. Therefore, a cleared guidance with regard to the economic ownership over the 
intangible should be developed by OECD taking into consideration the entitlement to 
intangible related return concept. 
 
The legal ownership over the intangible should be respected unless it clearly deviates from 
the economic substance of the transaction and the conduct of the parties. In cases of such 
deviation from the legal arrangement, the objective should be to determine what a reasonable 
allocation between unrelated parties would be in the respective circumstances. Thus, the 
economic substance concept in relation to entitlement to intangible related returns should be 
more closely linked to the guidance already developed within the TPG with regard to the 
relation of the economic substance with the arm's length principle. Disregarding the 
contractual terms by tax authorities should be limited to exceptional cases as provided within 
para. 1-64 - 1.69 of the TPG and para. 9.161 - 9.194 of TPG.  Without such reference to the 
concept of economic substance, potential re-characterization by the tax authorities outside the 
strict guidance may potentially lead to double taxation or double non-taxation. 
 
The entity that does not bear or control the risks associated with the activities related to 
development, enhancement, maintenance and protection of intangibles would not be entitled 
to intangible related returns, but should be reimbursed for the activities performed. 
Dependant on the substance of the rights of the party, an entitlement to share of the profit 
derived from the use of the intangible may be provided, such as in the case of the distributor. 
However, such share of the profits does not lead to ownership over the marketing intangible, 
respectively it could not be by default translated into something capable of being owned and 
controlled. The entitlement to intangible related returns should be made dependent on case by 
case basis and should follow the way of independent parties operate at arm's length. The 
entitlement to intangible related return in case of R&D activities by no meaning should be 
considered as default, as it may be reflected as remuneration for manufacturing or charged as 
service provision, following that the outsourcing of such activities between unrelated parties 
are to be met in practice. Further guidance with regard to the arm's length compensation to 
the services rendered should be provided. Clear distinction should be made between the 
entitlement to intangible related returns and the reimbursement to the distributor/ researcher 
for the services provided. 
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